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Introduction 
 
 
“The laws that govern societies are the laws of natural order 
the most advantageous to humankind.”  
 
With these words, François Quesnay opened his essay on The Despotism 
of China in 1767. The essay would be one of Quesnay’s last contributions 
to the field of economics—a discipline that he helped establish—and this 
first sentence captured the organizing principle of his entire economic 
thought: natural order. The economic domain, Quesnay believed, was 
governed by a natural order and constituted an autonomous, self-regulating 
system that required no external intervention. Quesnay and his followers 
would become known around the world as “Physiocrats,” a neologism 
meant to designate “the rule of nature.” The same year, 1767, Quesnay’s 
leading disciple, Pierre Paul Le Mercier de La Rivière, would similarly open 
his book, The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies, by 
declaring: “There exists a natural order for the government of men reunited 
in society.”
1
  
 
This conception of natural order grounded the Physiocrats’ theories 
of economic production and of the wealth of nations. It was the very 
foundation of their argument for free commerce and trade. The natural 
order that reigned in the economic domain demanded that there be no 
interference with the laws of nature. And so Quesnay would write in his 
General Maxims of Political Economy, also penned in 1767, italicizing and 
capitalizing his central economic theory: “Let us maintain complete liberty 
of commerce; for THE POLICY IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
TRADE THAT IS THE SUREST, THE MOST APPROPRIATE, THE 
MOST PROFITABLE TO THE NATION AND TO THE STATE 
CONSISTS IN COMPLETE FREEDOM OF COMPETITION.”
2
 
 
The Physiocrats’ idea of natural order would also give rise to a 
political theory that Quesnay and Le Mercier would call “legal despotism.” 
In their writings from 1767, Quesnay and Le Mercier argued for a unitary 
executive—an absolute, hereditary monarch—who would recognize and 
thereby instantiate the laws of nature without the benefit of a legislative 
body. Precisely because the natural laws were perfect and most 
advantageous to mankind, Quesnay and Mercier argued, there was nothing 
for a legislator to do in the economic sphere. Man-made laws and 
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government intervention could only disrupt the natural laws governing 
economic production. Positive man-made law, then, was relegated to one 
and only one area: to criminalize and severely punish those men who did 
not recognize and abide by the natural order, those men who were 
unregulated—“déréglés”—and disorderly, those who stole and were wicked.  
 
The idea of natural order and the theory of legal despotism 
fundamentally reshaped the relationship between, on the one hand, 
commerce, trade, and economic relations, and, on the other hand, 
punishment practices and theory. In the period before, the dominant view 
rested on the idea that the criminal sanction was one form of governmental 
intervention no different from the general administration of commerce and 
trade. Punishments formed part of a larger administrative framework 
intended to set prices and regulate all domains of human behavior, whether 
economic, social, or penal. That earlier framework is captured best by the 
famous tract of Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, published in 
1764. In the period after, a different vision would come to dominate, and 
the criminal sanction—as opposed to free trade policies—would become 
viewed as an extraordinary device that enabled the state to legitimately 
intervene in the penal area, there and there alone. 
 
By means of this fundamental transformation, the criminal sanction 
changed from an ordinary form of regulation no different than tariffs and 
levies to an exceptional mechanism of state intervention in situations lying 
beyond or outside the market model. By pushing the state outside the 
market and giving it free rein there and there alone, the Physiocratic ideal of 
natural order facilitated the expansion of the penal sphere. It made it easier 
to resist government intervention in economics, but to penalize any 
deviations from the norm. It lightened any real and potential resistance to 
government initiatives in law enforcement, the criminal law, and its 
execution.  
 
The Physiocratic ideas of natural order and legal despotism would 
be rehearsed in history, resurfacing in different guises, and ultimately would 
shape the dominant imagination in the United States. Jeremy Bentham in 
the nineteenth century would essentially reproduce this rationality by 
means of a unique alchemy that blended Cesare Beccaria on crime and 
punishment with Adam Smith on economic liberty. In the next century, 
neoliberal economists and thinkers such as Richard Posner and Richard 
Epstein would reformulate, in a more technical and updated vocabulary, the 
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same idea of natural order, but this time under the rubric of “market 
efficiency.” Precisely because of the natural efficiency of markets, the 
government would be relegated to the realm beyond or outside the market, 
to the realm of “market bypassing” or “market failure” where there and 
there alone the government could legitimately intervene and punish 
severely. Quesnay’s ideas of natural order and legal despotism would be 
eerily reflected, in a different and updated vocabulary to be sure, in this 
succinct passage by Richard Posner in an article in 1985: 
 
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to 
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary, 
compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit or implicit—in 
situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a 
more efficient method of allocating resources than forced exchange. 
. . . When transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by 
definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources. 
Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be discouraged by a 
legal system bent on promoting efficiency.
3
 
 
A new discourse, a more technical jargon, but essentially the same idea: the 
economic sphere is governed by a certain orderliness that should make us 
cautious regarding government interference; by contrast, the state should 
have free rein in the penal sphere. There, it can and should set prices—in 
the words of Bentham, a grand menu of prices for human behavior.  
 
The Physiocrats’ idea of natural order gave birth to our modern 
vision of neoliberal penality. Neoliberal penality is the form of rationality in 
which the penal sphere is pushed outside political economy and serves the 
function of a boundary: the penal sanction is marked off from the 
dominant logic of classical economics as the only space where order is 
legitimately enforced by the state. On this view, the bulk of human 
interaction—which can be understood through an economic lens—is 
viewed as voluntary, compensated, orderly, and tending toward the 
common good; the penal sphere is the outer bound, where the government 
can legitimately interfere, there and there alone.  
 
The term “neoliberal” and its companion, “neoliberalism,” of 
course, are deeply contested—like most “ism” terms—even among those 
who carefully study the concepts.
4
 In this article, I employ the term 
neoliberal because I am addressing the space of contemporary liberal 
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thought that is more heavily influenced by economics, but I do so in a 
slightly larger historical and theoretical sense than some of the more critical 
writings on neoliberalism. The latter tend to focus more heavily on the 
period following 1970—referring to the period before that as “embedded 
liberalism”—and especially on the rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher, on the wave of privatization that ensued, and on the 
“Washington Consensus” that followed in the 1990s.
5
 I am trying to 
capture a more historical and political theoretic notion that is more 
continuous with early liberalism—that interprets neoliberal thought as a 
mere recurrence or reiteration, often in more technical jargon, of ideas that 
were central to early liberal economic thought.  
 
I use the term neoliberal here to capture a set of default assumptions 
in favor of less state intervention in economic markets. It is not intended to 
map on perfectly to the more extreme market libertarian position associated 
with the early Chicago School. It is instead a more moderate and somewhat 
more popularized version—one that essentially relates back, over a longer 
arc of history and political theory, to early liberal thought. It is the view that 
government intervention in the economic domain tends to be inefficient 
and should therefore be avoided. What characterizes this more moderate 
view is a set of softer a priori assumptions. In contrast to the more radical 
rhetoric of the early Chicago School, contemporary neoliberals contend 
only that less regulated market mechanisms tend to work better, in part 
because of lower transaction costs, but also because market participants are 
better information gatherers and tend to be more invested in the ultimate 
outcome; and that government agencies suffer from greater principal-agent 
problems, are less nimble at adjusting to changing market conditions, and 
become more entrenched and subject to interest group capture. These 
familiar arguments, together, tend to promote a loose default position that 
favors “free market” mechanisms over “regulation.” 
 
There is of course, inevitably, a chronological dimension to the term 
neoliberalism: it distinguishes twentieth century thinkers, such as Friedrich 
Hayek, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler, from early liberal thinkers, 
such as François Quesnay and Adam Smith. But it is the continuity rather 
than the chronological differentiation that attracts me to the term. My 
purpose in using the term is to bridge the chronological dimension. Rather 
than to emphasize the radical nature and “shock” political effects of 
neoliberalism, I seek to trace the core idea of market efficiency back to an 
earlier idea of natural order. This is not to suggest that the differences 
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between the earlier liberal writings and neoliberalism are only a matter of 
vocabulary and technical jargon. There are subtle nuances—and at least two 
immediately come to mind. The first is what one might call an ideological 
difference. Early liberal thinkers had a set of ideas that, they argued, had not 
yet been put to the test; they were, in a sense, more utopian or idealist, and 
claimed to be reacting against a dominant political economy of 
mercantilism, cameralism, or centralized and controlled economic 
governance. Contemporary neoliberals come after a lot of experimentation 
and some history, including the Great Depression, the New Deal, the wave 
of privatizations, and the 2008 financial collapse. In this sense, 
contemporary neoliberalism often has a more pronounced ideological 
element because it tends to minimize historical instances of market failure. 
The second difference has to do with conviction or faith: neoliberalism here 
is understood as the belief that we actually live in a free market system in 
the United States today and that this system has triumphed. It is the belief 
that the early European markets of the eighteenth century were completely 
and excessively regulated and that those of the United States today are free 
or freer. These two dimensions of difference are important and will be 
discussed at length, but should not overshadow the continuity from the idea 
of natural order to the notion of market efficiency, nor the central purpose 
of this article.  
 
The key point is that the grounding assumption of neoliberal 
penality and of early liberal economic thought, and, for that matter, of most 
opponents of early- and neoliberal penality—namely, the core belief in the 
duality of “free markets” versus “regulation”—is an illusion that is highly 
misleading and detrimental to our political union. The central categories of 
“natural order,” “market efficiency,” and the “free market,” as well as the 
categories of “regulation” or “heavily regulated markets” or the argument 
for “more regulation,” are rhetorical tropes that serve no useful analytic 
purpose, but that have had a devastating effect on our penal sphere.  
 
In this sense, this article asks the question: what work do these 
categories of “natural order” and “market efficiency” do for us? What do we 
achieve when we distribute mechanisms of market organization into the 
two categories—the free and the constrained—and then judge them on that 
basis? The answer it proposes is that we have developed these categories in 
order to place what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena (namely, 
different forms of market organization) in a coherent frame and to deploy 
simplistic heuristic devices to expedite our evaluation of different forms of 
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economic organization—but that those heuristic devices are faulty. In the 
process, we have created categories that are responsible, first, for facilitating 
our growing penal sphere and, second, for naturalizing and thereby masking 
the distributive consequences associated with different methods of 
organizing markets.  
 
Let me emphasize. It is not just that the categories are not useful. 
They have been affirmatively detrimental. The logic of neoliberal penality 
has facilitated contemporary punishment practices by encouraging the belief 
that the legitimate space for government intervention is in the penal 
sphere—there and there alone. The logic of neoliberalism has greased the 
wheels for our carceral expansion. Naturally, since neoliberal penality is but 
a form of rationality or logic, it has not caused mass incarceration in the 
United States. Other more immediate political and social practices—
including the War on Drugs, racial discrimination and profiling, law-and-
order politics in the 1970s, a Southern backlash to the Civil Rights 
movement, the collapse of the rehabilitative model, and sentencing 
enhancements, to name but a few—all contributed more proximately to the 
growing number of prison inmates. But neoliberal penality facilitated these 
practices by weakening the resistance to governmental initiatives in the 
penal domain because that is where the state may legitimately govern.  
 
The key to understanding our contemporary punishment practices, 
then, turns on the emergence in the eighteenth century of the idea of 
natural order and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, over the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, into the concept of market 
efficiency. It is the idea of natural order that renders coherent and makes 
possible the belief in self-adjusting and self-sustaining markets—the idea of 
self-stabilizing internal flows that function best when left alone. This 
conceptualization of natural orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of 
natural harmony in the economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth century 
thinkers to reimagine social reality, to separate economy and society, and to 
relocate and expand the penal sphere.  
 
This project begins, then, very far away in time and place from our 
current financial crisis—in the Parisian markets of the eighteenth century, 
with the establishment of the lieutenant générale de police du Châtelet de 
Paris and the “police” of bakers, grain merchants, and markets. So let me 
begin the story there.  
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I. Parisian Markets 
 
In early May 1739, commissioner Emmanuel Nicolas Parisot was doing his 
rounds in the Marais. As the investigator, examiner, and royal counselor 
responsible for the Saint-Antoine district, Parisot reported to René Hérault, 
lieutenant général de police at the Châtelet of Paris, the royal palace of 
justice. Parisot was at the Saint-Paul market going from baker to baker, 
weighing their bread, when he discovered at Jean Thyou’s stand “four 
three-pound breads each light one-and-a-half ounces.”
6
 At about the same 
time, commissioner Charles, also doing his rounds, discovered at Courtois’ 
bakery on rue de Chantre “one bread labeled eight pounds in weight, light 
two ounces, two others marked the same weight one ounce light each, six 
labeled four pounds in weight each one ounce off, another six pound bread 
light one ounce and a half, two others labeled six pounds in weight, eight 
others marked four pounds in weight, all a half ounce light.”
7
 Another 
commissioner, Delespinay, found a cache of underweight breads in a small 
room hidden in the back of Aublay’s bakery shop on the vieille rue du 
Temple. Delespinay immediately seized the bread and had it sent to the 
Sisters of the Charity of the Saint-Gervais parish.
8
 (Commissioner Charles 
had sent his confiscated bread to the Capuchin friars on the rue Saint 
Honoré and to the poor at the parish of Saint-Germain l’Auxerrois.)9 When 
the lieutenant de police held court the following May 5th, 1739, Hérault 
condemned the bakers but showed mercy and “this time only” sentenced 
each to only fifty livres in fines.10 
 
Later the same month, the 29th of May, master baker Amand, an 
elected syndic in charge of his community of master bakers, found himself 
accused of selling a loaf of bread in his shop—specifically, “one white bread 
weighing four pounds, at eleven sols”—at a higher price than market—to 
be exact, “three deniers for each pound above the common market price.”11 
Hérault declared Amand guilty, fined him three hundred livres, and 
stripped him of his elected office. In the sentencing order, Hérault ordered 
the other syndics to assemble within three days of the publication of his 
sentence and to proceed in their office to the election of a new syndic.
12
 A 
week earlier, Hérault had convicted Marie-Hebert Heguin of buying grain 
at market for resale and fined her 1,000 livres.13 A royal ordinance 
prohibited buying grain with the intention of reselling it: “It is permitted to 
purchase grain at market for one’s use; however, it is not permitted to buy 
grain for resale: the reason, very simply, is that he who buys for purposes of 
resale must necessarily gain from the transaction and, as a result, will sell it 
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at a higher price than market rate, which constitutes a punishable 
monopoly.”
14
  
 
 It is in these terms that Me. Edme de la Poix de Freminville 
described the Parisian grain markets in his Dictionnaire ou traité de la 
police générale published in 1758, in which he collected, assembled, 
organized, classified, reported and reprinted a myriad of these sentences and 
royal ordinances. A manual of policing, a compendium of disciplinary 
practices, Freminville’s dictionary codified alphabetically a gamut of rules 
and prescriptions covering not only subsistence—grains, bread, meats, fish, 
poultry, oysters, and legumes—but also gaming, sanitation, religious 
practice, guilds, sexual mores, even the charivaria. The dictionary contained 
564 pages of the most minute regulation of, well, practically everything.  
 
 Freminville was intimately familiar with these ordinances. Himself a 
bailli for the village and surroundings of Lapalisse in the Auvergne region of 
central France, Freminville had similar magisterial powers in his countryside 
as a lieutenant général de police would have had in Paris. Freminville 
published his dictionary more than fifty years after the first volume of 
Delamare’s famous Traité de Police had appeared in 1705—the first of four 
massive in-folio tomes documenting and tracing in intricate detail the 
history of the police of Paris. Freminville, though, targeted a wider audience 
with his dictionary. Whereas Delamare had written for the urban police 
officer—especially the Parisian police administrator—Freminville pitched 
his treatise to the far more numerous country magistrates and prosecutors—
the many procureurs fiscaux, who resided in each village in France and 
administered the police function, meting out justice and regulating all 
aspects of daily life. By alphabetizing the rules and making them available in 
a more concise, single volume, in-quarto, Freminville sought to disseminate 
the disciplinary rules further, to publicize them, to make them known—in 
their finest detail.  
 
“Transgression of laws and ordinances are crimes both large and 
small, but however slight they may be, the ministry of the procureur fiscal 
must not tolerate them,” Freminville observed. “To despise but ignore small 
mistakes is to allow larger ones, and impunity throws villains into new 
infidelities.”
15
 Quoting Saint-Bernard, from Book 3 of de Consideratione, 
Freminville declared that impunity is the “daughter of negligence, mother 
of insolence, source of impudence, nurse of iniquity and of transgressions of 
law.”
16
 He concluded: “The officer whose role is to suppress anything that 
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deviates from what is prescribed as orderly must not neglect, even with 
respect to minor things, to punish those who contravene.”
17
 
 
 Oddly, Freminville himself was deeply skeptical of these ordinances 
and opposed the restrictions on commerce associated with the regulation of 
the grain and bread markets. Freminville was a partisan of free trade, he 
professed. “It is indeed a delicate matter to tinker with the price of grain 
and its commerce, because he who regulates with an eye to reducing the 
market price often discovers that, as a result of unforeseen circumstances, 
the very regulations that he crafted, far from reducing it, raise the price and 
reduce the supply of the goods in question.”
18
 Freminville was a free trader 
and believed that self-interest would serve to ensure an abundant supply of 
wheat and barley. This, he thought, was self-evident and demonstrated 
practically every day: whereas, for instance, the grain reserves maintained by 
the state and provinces had to be thrown in the river, rotten and infested, 
private individuals preserved their stock well in their granaries. “Such waste 
would never happen with an individual,” Freminville observed, “because it 
is their own property.”
19
 Private property and personal interest would help 
forestall such sordid outcomes and prevent the recurring grain shortages—
les disettes, as they were called—that plagued France.  
 
Despite his free trade ideology, or perhaps because of it, Freminville 
dissected and catalogued, reported, cried—much like the sentences 
themselves were cried at market—and decried the intricate details of myriad 
rules and regulations. Of Freminville’s lengthy book, ninety pages concern 
the cultivation and commerce of grain, the sale of bread, the regulation of 
the boulangers, meuniers, etc. That represents a full sixth of the entire 
dictionary. And it covered everything from prohibiting the purchase of 
grain on the stalk to prohibiting anyone from walking in fields that have 
been sown (especially to pick flowers); from fixing the hours of sale to fixing 
the dates for harvesting; from prohibiting speech that would tend to raise 
grain prices to requiring seminaries and colleges to warehouse three years 
worth of grain at all times.  
 
All sales, naturally, were to take place at market. “It is forbidden, 
first, to sell or buy grains outside the market. The age-old prohibitions on 
this question, which dated back to the fourteenth century, had never been 
repealed, and since 1709 had been taken up again and applied more or less 
strictly.”
20
 To ensure that all sales were conducted at market, other 
regulations imposed an obligation to certify market sales. A sentence issued 
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in the police tribunal of the old Châtelet, dated October 10, 1681, confirms 
the confiscation of a “muid (measure) of flour in fifteen bags” for not 
having obtained a “certificate from where such merchandise was bought,” 
and for failing to turn over the goods “to the measurers upon arrival at the 
doors and barriers” of the city.
21
  
 
Once at the market, producers were forbidden to sell their grain and 
flour before a specified hour—an hour that varied according to the season. 
The eighteenth-century regulations followed daylight savings time.
22
 There 
were also rules about who could buy first at market. “Typically, the opening 
[of the market] was reserved for private individuals,” Afanassiev writes, 
“that is to say, those who were neither bakers nor traders. Members of this 
latter group were not admitted until later. In Paris, they did not have the 
right to come to the market or be represented there before noon, nor could 
they even talk with vendors near the perimeter of the market.”
23
 Other 
ordinances punished speech that could tend to increase the price of grain.  
 
According to Freminville, the grain trade had to be one of the main 
concerns of the county prosecutor. Freminville repeatedly underscored the 
importance of the market regulations: grain and grain markets, he affirmed, 
“should constitute the largest and principal responsibility of the Procurer 
Fiscal.”24 “We are dealing here with the lives of our fellow humans, and it is 
imperative that they not be sacrificed to the monopolists who meddle in 
selling and reselling grain.”
25
 Freminville’s dictionary covered the grain 
industry exhaustively, and there were in fact so many regulations of the 
market that, for the dictionary entry on “Marchés”—the entry on 
markets—Freminville merely refers the reader, by cross reference, to 
another entry.
26
 His dictionary reads: 
 
MARKETS.    SEE   POLICE. 
 
To our modern eyes, the Parisian police des grains—that intricate 
and extensive web of royal decrees and ordinances that governed every 
minute aspect of the commerce of grain under the ancien régime and that 
gave rise to what has been called “the grain wars of the eighteenth 
century”—has come to symbolize excessive government control and 
intervention. The policing of the grain trade—that tangled lattice of edicts 
and decrees intended to keep down the price of bread in Paris and the 
provinces—stands today as a labyrinth, a maze, a morass of regulations, of 
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minute government tinkering in the most atomic details of the commercial 
exchange.  
 
Codes, dictionaries, and treatises of the police would proliferate in 
the mid-eighteenth century to catalogue and disseminate these ordinances. 
The 1750s and 60s were an important period—not, naturally, for the 
codification of rules themselves. That had been recurring since at least the 
sixteenth century and the important dates were well known: the réglements 
of 1567 and 1577, the déclaration of August 31, 1699 or April 19, 1723. 
No, the mid-eighteenth century was an important period for the 
dissemination of the rules, for the cataloguing, for publicizing the 
regulations. 1758 marked not only the publication of Freminville’s 
Dictionnaire, but also of Duchesne’s augmented and authoritative second 
edition of Code de la police, ou analyse des réglemens de police, divisé en 
douze titres. Originally published in Paris the year before, Duchesne’s 
popular treatise would already be supplemented and reprinted a year later 
and it compiled, in over 480 pages, all the police rules and regulations that 
extended over the areas of religion, customs, health, science and liberal arts, 
commerce, manufacture, mechanical arts, servants, domestics, and the poor. 
1758 also marked the publication of the first volumes of the Code Louis 
XV: Recueil des principaux Edits, déclarations, Ordonnances, Arrêts, 
Sentences et réglemens concernant la justice, police et finances depuis 1722 
jusqu’en 1740. The Recueil would assemble all the important ordinances 
and sentences on policing and grow to a twelve volume set, in-12.27 
Numerous other codes, including Deslandes’ 1767 Code de la police ou 
analyse des réglemens de police, divisé en douze titres, would be published 
and reprinted in Paris during the period.  
 
It was precisely this maze of ordinances that Adam Smith, in The 
Wealth of Nations, castigated as “such absurd regulations, as frequently 
aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth, into the dreadful calamity 
of a famine”
28
 or as “the folly of human laws.”
29
 It was an economic 
approach, Smith would famously suggest, that “embraced all the prejudices 
of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a system of restraint and 
regulation.”
30
 And still today, most commentators characterize the period as 
excessively regulated, over-regulated, a frenzy of market intervention—the 
minute regulation of the smallest infraction. Order-maintenance at the 
most micro level.   
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II. Our Modern Free Markets 
   
The contrast could not be greater with the general perception of 
contemporary markets—whether in grain or more broadly. Today, most of 
us tend to view modern markets and commodity exchanges as relatively 
free. Commerce has been liberalized, the forces of free market exchange 
have been unleashed, and the constraints of the past lifted. Self-adjusting 
market mechanisms have replaced the police des grains and, in a far more 
efficient manner, ensure reasonable prices and abundant supply. Though 
globalization and population growth loom on the horizon as a potential 
threat to the adequate supply of commodities, voluntary and free market 
exchange at home is the model of choice.   
 
 “[T]he close of the twentieth century saw a virtual canonization of 
market organization as the best, indeed the only effective, way to structure 
an economic system,” observes professor Richard Nelson at Columbia 
University.
31
 As J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer add, 
“Throughout Eastern and Western Europe as well as in North America 
during the 1980s, there was a dramatic shift toward a popular belief in the 
efficacy of self-adjusting market mechanisms. Indeed, the apparent failure 
of Keynesian economic policies, the strains faced by the Swedish social 
democratic model, and the collapse of Eastern bloc economies led many 
journalistic observers to argue that capitalism is a system of free markets 
that has finally triumphed.”
32
  Nelson captures the dominant, orthodox 
view succinctly: 
 
For-profit firms are the vehicles of production. They decide 
what to produce and how, on the basis of their assessments 
about what is most profitable…. Competition among firms 
assures that production is efficient and tailored to what users 
want, and prices are kept in line with costs. The role of 
government is limited to establishing and maintaining a 
body of law to set the rules for the market game and 
assuring the availability of basic infrastructure needed for 
the economy to operate.
33
 
 
Nelson concedes that this is a simplified version of “the standard textbook 
model in economics,”
34
 perhaps even a bit “folk theory.”
35
 But it is, in broad 
outline, an accurate description of a dominant view that has had a powerful 
influence on the latter part of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
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As Boyer suggests, accurately I believe, “The market is now considered by a 
majority of managers and politicians as the coordinating mechanism ‘par 
excellence.’”
36
  
 
The financial crisis of 2008 shook these beliefs, but did not 
displaced them. There is for instance, in the United States today, a 
remarkable and persistent resistance to nationalization of banks and auto-
makers, and a continued faith in the abilities of the market. This was 
evident from the debate over the nationalization of banks tinkering on 
bankruptcy in the Spring of 2009. It was not possible then to talk about 
nationalization without mentioning its temporary nature. In fact, the 
preferred term for temporary nationalization became “preprivatization”—
the idea that we had to nationalize financial institutions in order to better 
privatize them after a few months.
37
 The contrast to the penal sphere could 
not be sharper. Never in a million years would anyone talk about 
“preprivatizing” corrections or prisons or punishment. The resistance to this 
way of speaking in the punishment sphere and the contrast to the economic 
domain remain so profound. 
 
The standard view of market superiority in the economic domain 
traces, generally, to the Chicago School of economics and its founders, 
Milton Friedman and George Stigler. The central tenets of the Chicago 
School are usefully summarized by David Leonhardt in the following terms: 
“The Chicago School believes that markets—that is, millions of individuals 
making separate decisions—almost always function better than economies 
that are managed by governments. In a market system, prices adjust 
whenever there is a shortage or a glut, and the problem soon resolves itself. 
Just as important, companies constantly compete with each other, which 
helps bring down prices, improves the quality of goods and ultimately lifts 
living standards.”
38
 
 
To be sure, many commentators today, especially law scholars and 
lawyers who toil in the regulatory domain, consider this “free market 
libertarian” version of the Chicago School a bit of an extreme position. And 
even some of the staunchest Chicago School adherents have themselves 
softened their claims to allow for slightly more governmental intervention 
in cases of market failure due to collective action, monopolistic, or other 
coordination problems. Nevertheless, the more extreme market libertarian 
position has helped shape a more moderate view that is dominant today: the 
view that government intervention in the economic domain tends to be 
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inefficient and should therefore be avoided. This view is characterized by a 
set of gentler a priori assumptions: market mechanisms tend to work better, 
government agencies and interventions tend to be less efficient. These 
assumptions reflect a more popular and current notion of political economy 
that essentially provides, as David Harvey suggests, that “The role of the 
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework [characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade]…. State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum 
because, according to the theory,” Harvey elaborates, “the state cannot 
possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) 
and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state 
interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.”
39
 These 
are familiar arguments and, together, they tend to promote a loose default 
position that favors market mechanisms over “regulation”—a tilt in favor of 
markets. They form precisely what I would call “neoliberalism.”  
 
The evidence is clear, at least in public opinion polls. In a Financial 
Times/Harris Poll opinion poll conducted September 6 and 17, 2007, 49% 
of respondents in the United States answered affirmatively—in contrast to 
17% who responded negatively—to the question “Do you think a free-
market, capitalist economy (an economic system in which prices and wages 
are determined by unrestricted competition between businesses, with 
limited government regulation or fear of monopolies) is the best economic 
system or not?”
40
 In another poll, a twenty-nation poll conducted by the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of 
Maryland, researchers found that an average 71% of respondents in the 
United States agree with the statement that “The free enterprise system and 
free market economy is the best system on which to base the future of the 
world;” only 24% of respondents disagreed with that statement.
41
 Although 
these polls were taken before the financial collapse of 2008 and the numbers 
themselves may also be in a recession, it is likely that they too will recover 
along with any expected future economic recovery.  
 
This dominant view is reinforced daily in the leading newspapers, in 
the media and through the voice of our national leaders both on the right 
and on the left—often in the most unexpected places.
42
 Contemporary self-
adjusting market mechanisms have become the norm, and we are no longer 
at the mercy of the minute disciplinary regimentation characterized by the 
Parisian police des grains of the mid-eighteenth century. At least, that’s 
what many like to tell themselves.  
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III. Chicago Board of Trade, circa 2000 
 
In the wheat pits at the Chicago Board of Trade, 12:01 P.M., March 20, 
1996, following a period of tight supplies in the wheat market. Loud 
buzzers and Board staff visually signaled the close of the market for the 
March 1996 wheat futures. The closing period—which spanned from 
12:00 P.M. to 12:01 P.M. on March 20th—had just expired. There were 
sixty-one buy order contracts that were still unfilled at the end of the 
closing period, and the last contracts had traded at $5.30 to $5.35 a bushel, 
in line with the morning’s trades. Two traders who held market-on-close 
orders, George F. Frey and John C. Bedore, bid up the price through 
closing to approximately $6.00 per bushel, but they were met with no 
responses from other members of the pit.  
 
At 12:02 P.M., one minute past the close, J. Brian Schaer, a local in 
the pit, offered to sell contracts at $7.00, and approximately twelve seconds 
later, at 12:02:12 P.M., sold thirty-one contracts at that price to Frey and 
Bedore—who had been bidding up the price hoping to close their open 
orders. Donald W. Scheck, another local, then offered contracts at $7.50, 
with Brian Schaer matching that offer. In the next half a minute, Scheck 
sold fourteen contracts to a broker Jay P. Ieronimo and Schaer sold another 
sixteen contracts to Frey and Ieronimo, with the final trades taking place at 
12:02:50 P.M.—one minute and fifty seconds past closing.  
 
 Rule 1007.00 of the Chicago Board of Trade provides that the pit 
committee—in this case, the “Wheat Pit Committee” chaired by Jay 
Ieronimo, who had just traded post-closing—could authorize an extension 
of one minute only of the closing period in the case of an extraordinary 
expiration. That never happened,
43
 but even if it had, it would only have 
extended the trading period to 12:02 P.M., which would not have covered 
the trades contracted after that. A number of Board officials, including 
Chicago Board of Trade chairman, Patrick Arbor, and the Exchange Pit 
Reporter Floor Supervisor, Patrick Sgaraglino, gathered to discuss whether 
any trades after 12:02 P.M. should be honored and cleared through the 
house. They decided the trades would stand because of “special 
circumstances” surrounding the March wheat futures.  
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 Ieronimo, in his capacity as chair of the Wheat Pit Committee, then 
began asking around to find out if any of the traders were interested in 
holding a modified closing call—known in the trade as an “MCC” and 
consisting of “a two-minute post-close trading session which may occur 
after the end of a trading session and allows market users to close out 
unliquidated positions. Pit committees schedule MCC sessions only when 
there is an expression of interest. The MCC settlement price, which serves 
as the basis for the trading range during the MCC session, is selected by the 
pit committee.”
44
 Brian Schaer, who had sold contracts past 12:02 P.M., 
was apparently the only trader who expressed interest in an MCC.  
 
Ieronimo decided to hold the MCC.  “A bull horn was used to 
announce that an MCC would be held from 12:14 P.M. to 12:16 P.M. A 
few seconds before the start of the MCC, an Exchange official announced 
that the MCC price range would be $5.30 to $5.32 per bushel.”
45
 Ray 
Czupek, the floor manager and broker for Louis Dreyfus Corporation—
which still held a significant long position in March wheat—offered 
contracts at $5.32 per bushel—thus entering the market for new business in 
violation of the Board rule against entering new orders during an MCC. 
Brian Shaer and Donald Scheck, who had both sold contracts ranging 
between $7.00 and $7.50 after the one-minute extension to closing, were 
the only ones to bite. Schaer and Scheck both bought contracts sufficient to 
offset the entire positions that they had just created post-closing, and made 
profits on their trades of, respectively, $434,800 and $152,600. There were 
no other trades made during the MCC. Others involved in the earlier 
trading saw large losses, some as high as $300,000. 
  
 The Office of Investigations and Audits of the Chicago Board of 
Trade conducted a quick review of the March futures expiration, and about 
a month later the Business Conduct Committee of the Board issued charges 
against Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey, Bedore, and Czupek, as well as 
Dreyfus and two other firms. They were charged with violations of Chicago 
Board Rules 1007.00, 350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, proscribing after-
hours trading, MCC conventions, and hedging rules. Board Rules 1007.00 
and 1007.02, for instance, set forth the following restrictions on trading: 
 
On the last day of trading in an expiring future, a bell shall be 
rung at 12 o’clock noon designating the beginning of the close 
of the expiring future. Trading shall be permitted thereafter for 
a period not to exceed one minute and quotations made 
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during this time period shall constitute the close. When in the 
opinion of the relevant Pit Committee extraordinary 
conditions prevail any such one minute period may be 
extended to two minutes by special authorization of the 
relevant Pit Committee… 
 
Immediately following the prescribed closing procedure for all 
contracts, there shall be a two (2) minute trading period (the 
“modified closing call”). All trades which may occur during 
regularly prescribed trading hours may occur during the call at 
prices within the lesser of the actual closing range or a range of 
three (3) official trading increments, i.e., one (1) increment 
above and below the settlement price, or at prices within the 
lesser of the actual closing range or a range of nine (9) official 
trading increments, i.e., four (4) increments above and below 
the settlement price, as the Regulatory Compliance Committee 
shall prescribe; (ii) no new orders may be entered into the call; 
(iii) cancellations may be entered into the call; (iv) stop, limit 
and other resting orders elected by prices during the close may 
be executed during the call; and (v) individual members may 
trade as a principal and/or agent during the call. In accordance 
with the determination of the Regulatory Compliance 
Committee, CBOT contracts shall be traded during the 
Modified Closing Call as follows: Lesser of actual closing range 
or nine trading increments [for] Wheat Futures and Options.
46
 
 
 
 During the summer of 1996, the Board entered into settlement 
negotiations with Schaer, Scheck, and the other individuals and firms, and 
resolved the charges by way primarily of written reprimand. Settlements 
were reached with Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey and Bedore by issuing 
letters of reprimand against each of them, and with Dreyfus Corporation by 
means of an admission of wrongdoing and a $10,000 fine.   
 
The Divisions of Enforcement and Trading & Markets of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, however, recommended that 
the Commission review the six settlements because they did not believe that 
the written sanctions were “commensurate with the gravity of the alleged 
violation and otherwise failed to conform to Commission guidance on 
sanctions.”
47
 In light of the Commission’s decision to review, the Chicago 
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Board of Trade conducted additional investigations and interviewed 38 
persons, had the interviews transcribed and then reviewed by the staff of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which oversees the Board; the 
Board prepared follow-up questions for 19 persons at the request of the 
Commission staff, and resubmitted the second round of interviews to the 
Commission. The Board also submitted documentary evidence of trading 
cards, order tickets, and other reports.  
 
The Commission conducted additional investigation of its own, 
reviewing—in addition to the Board documents, the record of the 
disciplinary proceedings, and written argument by the parties—
“observations of Commission floor surveillance staff during the expiration” 
and “information independently obtained by the Commission staff.”
48
 The 
latter included “interviews with commercial participants, market analyses, 
trading profiles of the two locals [Shaer and Scheck] involved in the 
expiration, a trade practice investigation, review of data to determine 
compliance with speculative position limits, and a review of the ‘gap’ 
function in the CBOT’s price reporting system.”
49
  
 
The Commission set aside the sanctions and remanded the cases 
back to the Board of Trade because the penalties had not been severe 
enough. “In order to protect the integrity of the markets, the exchanges 
must vigorously enforce their rules concerning trading hours and impose 
meaningful sanctions in disciplinary proceedings alleging trading after the 
close,” three Commissioners declared. “We believe that imposing 
reprimands for misconduct as serious as that alleged here, even in the 
context of settled proceedings, reflects an apparent unwillingness on the 
part of the CBOT to enforce its rules in the manner necessary to ensure an 
effective self-regulatory disciplinary program.”
50
 
 
The United States Attorney’s Office in Chicago began investigating 
trading-hour infractions on the Chicago Board of Trade. In order to 
preempt further federal intervention, the Board revised its rules regarding 
the possible extension of the closing period. “Most notably, the CBOT 
deleted the provision under which the close of an expiring contract could be 
extended from one minute to two minutes, thus eliminating potential 
confusion among floor members about the appropriate duration for a close 
in an expiring contract. The CBOT also now precludes the pit reporters 
from accepting price quotations more than 30 seconds after the close for 
futures in order to assure that trading is halted on time.”
51
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IV.  Framing the Question 
 
More than two centuries separate the police des grains and these 
enforcement proceedings at the Chicago Board of Trade. The two periods 
bear important similarities and differences. Yet our perception of the two 
could not be more radically divergent. The Paris markets of the mid-
eighteenth century represent to us today the epitome of excess regulation—
of government intervention gone awry, of authoritarian control of the 
economy. In contrast, the Chicago Board of Trade reflects, to our modern 
eyes, the epitome of the free market in the western world, the pinnacle of 
free trade, the zenith of late-modern capitalism. Simply put, the Chicago 
Board of Trade is the free market. When we look at the Chicago Board or 
the New York Stock Exchange, we do not see the intricate web of 
regulations regarding closing periods and trading hours, access, surveillance, 
and computer monitoring. We do not see Chicago Board Rules 1007.00, 
350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, proscribing after-hours trading, MCC 
conventions, and hedging rules. We see the free market at work. How did 
that come about? 
 
At both times, the market was the exclusive venue in which to 
exchange the desired commodities and the markets were highly 
administered. Who, when, where, how—the hours of opening and closing, 
the identity of the merchants, traders, and buyers, the means of delivery, 
controls on variations in pricing—all aspects of trading on the markets were 
regulated. Our contemporary markets—whether the Chicago Board of 
Trade, the New York Mercantile Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, 
or any of the other exchanges—are shot through with layers of overlapping 
governmental supervision, of exchange rules and regulations, of federal and 
state criminal investigations, and of exchange self-policing and self-
regulatory mechanisms—as evident in the case of Schaer and Scheck. Our 
contemporary markets, like the Parisian markets of the eighteenth century, 
are policed.  
 
Naturally, there are also marked differences. No police prefect or 
procureur fiscal sets the right price of a loaf of bread or a stack of wheat 
today—the prix commun du marché—although the commission for 
trading the goods may be fixed and, of course, the most important 
commodity of all—money—is set by the central bank both in the United 
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States and in the European Union. No huissard patrols the exchange floor 
conducting inspections and ferreting out fraud or deception today—
although computer algorithms, federal investigators, and the exchanges 
themselves monitor each and every trade to detect suspicious activity, often 
on “a customer-by-customer basis.”
52
 Contemporary enforcement 
proceedings are more likely to involve self-regulatory mechanisms—self-
monitoring by the exchange itself, a chartered corporation not formally part 
of the state—though the earlier markets were also heavily self-policed under 
a guild system that functioned by means of elected syndics who policed and 
monitored the commercial activities of guild members.  
 
There are indeed important similarities and significant differences. 
As a practical matter, it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not infeasible 
to determine with exactitude whether the differences—with all their related 
technological transformations and metamorphoses—outweigh the 
similarities. It is impossible to quantify the uniform and gaze of the huissard 
and measure it against the electronic impulse that reads every single stock 
trade on a high volume alert. It is impracticable to weigh the impact of 
prohibiting la vente par échantillons—the sale by samples—against the 
effect of shutting down a thriving secondary market in mutual fund shares. 
“Royal ordinances first specified a ‘circle of prohibition’ around Paris 
having a radius of eight lieues (leagues). Inside this circle, any purchase of 
grain by bakers or traders, whether at market or in the growers’ storehouse, 
was forbidden”
53
: how do we measure the effect of this ordonnance and 
weigh it against the fixed delivery locations and the limited space for 
warehousing wheat in Chicago? How do we weigh the requirement that all 
grain be sold at the Paris markets against the contemporary requirement 
that all grain futures be traded at the Chicago Board of Trade? 
 
These questions have no answer, and yet we continue to perceive 
the two periods as radically different. How did it come about, exactly, that 
we would perceive the first economic regime—the Paris markets circa 
1750—as governed by, to borrow Adam Smith’s words, “such absurd 
regulations” and yet view the second regime, the Chicago Board of Trade of 
today, as “free”? What has shaped our perception so, that we would label 
one “regulated” and the other “free”? How did that come about? And at 
what price?  
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V.  The Birth of Natural Order 
 
First, how did we come to see the Parisian police des grains as the epitome 
of disciplinary regulation and the Chicago Board of Trade as the bastion of 
freedom? The answer, I believe, turns on the emergence in the eighteenth 
century of the idea of natural order—the notion of an economic system that 
is autonomous and achieves equilibrium without government 
intervention—and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, over the course 
of the twentieth century, into the concept of market efficiency. It is the idea 
of natural order that renders coherent and makes possible the belief in self-
adjusting and self-sustaining markets. The idea of self-stabilizing internal 
flows that function best when left alone—this conceptualization of natural 
orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of natural harmony in the 
economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth century thinkers to reimagine 
social reality, and it is what facilitates the understanding we have today. The 
idea of natural order also made possible the shift in semiotic meaning of the 
police des grains—from a policy viewed as necessary and freedom-
enhancing to a policy viewed as oppressive and misguided. In addition, it 
also helped displace an earlier belief that all men naturally tend toward 
criminal deviance, one that remains strong today only in the penal domain.  
 
The emergence and triumph of the idea of natural order was 
influenced by François Quesnay, the Marquis de Mirabeau, Dupont de 
Nemours, Le Mercier de la Rivière and other early French economists 
during the period 1756 to 1767. François Quesnay, a highly accomplished 
physician at Versailles, the first doctor to Mme. De Pompadour and first 
ordinary to Louis XV, and a prolific writer in the medical field, turned his 
attention to economics in 1756 and founded an intellectual circle that 
became known as “les économistes” or “les Physiocrates.” Quesnay and his 
disciples promoted the idea of an “ordre naturel” in the field of political 
economy. Their writings were highly influential both in France and abroad, 
and it is precisely their notion of natural order that metamorphosed, over 
time, into the modern economic notion of market efficiency that is at the 
heart of neoliberal thought. The Physiocrats’ idea of an “ordre naturel” 
helped make it possible for us today to believe that the Parisian markets 
were overregulated and that our contemporary markets are free. It is this 
notion that has shaped the way we see the world. 
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Of Public Economy and Police 
 
But it was not always so. Although today we tend to characterize the 
regulation of Parisian markets as excessively disciplinary and repressive, 
there was an earlier time when these same regulations formed part of a more 
coherent understanding that fell under an earlier rubric of “police” and that 
formed an integral part of the field of public economy. One central task of 
public economy, in the eyes of its earliest exponents, was precisely to ensure 
the abundance and cheapness of food and consumable goods at market—
what was called, at the time, providing for “bon marché.”  
 
The younger Adam Smith understood this well and in fact used the 
discourse of bon marché in his lectures on moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence in the early 1760s. It was precisely under the rubric of 
“police” that Smith lectured on public economy, on the regulation of 
markets, on monopolies, money, and trade: on how best to regulate 
agricultural production and manufacturing; on how to encourage the 
division of labor; on what to do with foreign trade; on how to manage 
currency, banking and interest rates—in sum, on how to render the state 
more opulent, on how to increase the wealth of a nation, or, which was the 
same thing for Smith, on how to enable citizens to obtain needed and 
desired food, clothes, and lodging—to satisfy the necessities of life. Smith 
placed his entire discussion of public economy under the rubric of “police” 
and he identified the principal task of “police” as facilitating bon marché. 
 
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, which he delivered at Glasgow 
University during the period 1762 to 1764—after the publication of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 but before the Wealth of Nations in 
1776—the young Adam Smith used—and used exclusively—the rubric of 
“police” to discuss public economy. Once the internal security of a nation 
was ensured and subjects could benefit from their private property, Smith 
reportedly lectured in 1762-63, the state’s attention should turn to the task 
of promoting the state’s wealth. “This produces what we call police,” Smith 
said. “Whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce, 
agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the 
police.”
54
 
 
The young Smith traced the notion of police to French 
administration, citing the folklore that the king of France demanded three 
services from his lieutenant général de police—namely, that he assure the 
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cleanliness and security of the nation and the abundance and cheapness of 
goods at market. Smith referred specifically to the famous lieutenant de 
police, Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’Argenson, chief of police 
in Paris from 1697 to 1718, and to the story that, upon acceding to the 
post, d’Argenson was told that the king of France expected him to take care 
of three things: “1
st
, the clean<n>ess or neteté; 2
nd
, the aisance, ease or 
security; and 3
rd
, bon marché or cheapness of provisions.”55 Smith lectured 
that the goal of police is “the means proper to produce opulence,”
56
 and that 
“the objects of Police are the cheapness of commodities, public security, and 
cleanliness.”
 57
 Under the heading of police, Smith stated in his 1763-64 
lectures, “we will consider the opulence of a state,”
58
 or, more specifically, 
“the consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the 
most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance.”
59
  
 
To the early public economists, including the young Smith, 
“police” was what ensured the abundant provision of necessary foods and 
commodities. As Michel Foucault, Pasquale Pasquino, Mariana Valverde, 
and others have shown, this early notion of “police” conveyed a number of 
meanings—not just the enforcement function associated with the lieutenant 
général de la police that, at least in some respects, resembles more closely 
our contemporary understanding of law enforcement, blue uniforms, and 
order maintenance.
60
 The term “police” also captured, in broader terms, 
what we could call today “administration,” but administration limited to 
the subdivisions of the state; the term gouvernement or governing, in 
contrast, covered the administration of l’Etat or the state. But the different 
meanings were imbricated: the administration of subsistence and markets 
fell under the jurisdiction of policing functions and were perceived as 
calling for surveillance. As the early Smith lectures demonstrate, public 
economy and “police” were continuous. 
 
Among the champions of the police des grains—for instance, 
commissioner Nicolas Delamare, author of the Traité de la police—the 
policing of markets reduced the price of bread and ensured bon marché. 
Delamare had seen famine and food shortages close up, he explained. A 
hands-off approach was the ideal, he suggested, but some oversight and 
administration was necessary especially in times of scarcity. True liberty 
required government organization. In order to achieve cheapness and 
plenty—the central goal of public economy—it was necessary to calibrate 
the market. On this earlier view, policing and economic welfare were one.  
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It would take but a small step to extend this logic directly to the 
field of crime and punishment. The young Milanese aristocrat, Cesare 
Beccaria, would do just this in his concise yet seminal tract, Dei delitti e 
delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments)—published anonymously in 
1764. The new field of public economy, Beccaria boasted, had tamed and 
civilized nations through commerce. “We have discovered the true relations 
between sovereign and subjects,” Beccaria declared, “and there is waged 
among nations a silent war by trade, which is the most humane sort of war 
and more worthy of reasonable men.”
61
 The same lessons, Beccaria believed, 
could tame and civilize our punishment practices, and, in the process, 
eliminate the brutal excesses of seventeenth century penality. Under 
Beccaria’s influence, the field of public economy would colonize the penal 
domain and impose the same logic of measured and proportional responses 
to the same problem of man’s natural tendency toward deviance. In 
Beccaria’s eyes, men behave the same way in economic and in social 
exchange: they privilege their own self-interest and always tend to break the 
rules. In the penal sphere—just as in the economic domain—the solution 
Beccaria proposed was to properly administer a rational framework of tariffs 
and prices. For Beccaria, “police” was an integral part of public economy. 
As a result, Beccaria’s lectures in public economy delivered in Milan in 
1769—the notes of which were published posthumously—covered five 
areas: agriculture, arts and manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police. 
“Of Police” constituted an integral part of the study of public economy—
an entire section alongside commerce and finance—because it shared the 
same rationality, namely that of public administration.  
 
 The common thread in the young Adam Smith and in Beccaria is 
the continuity between “police” administration and economics. For both, 
the two spheres were completely overlapping. To Smith, the umbrella 
category is “police,” and that category subsumes the discussion of public 
economy and the wealth of a nation. To Beccaria—and other cameralists of 
his time—the overarching category is public economy, within which 
“police” forms one important sector alongside commerce and finance. In 
both, though, the two domains are seamless and continuous. The two fields 
overlap and overlay. There is no alterity between them.   
 
Of Physiocrats, Natural Order, and Market Efficiency 
 
It is precisely this vision of a seamless relation between the field of public 
economy and the realm of “police” that gives way in the second half of the 
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eighteenth century to a far different ideal. If cheapness and plenty, if bon 
marché was the goal of public economy and of the police des grains at mid-
century, things could hardly have been more different only a decade later. 
The contrast is striking and captured by the new dogma of François 
Quesnay:  
 
Abondance et non-valeur n’est pas richesse. 
Disette et cherté est misère.  
Abondance et cherté est opulence.62  
 
In other words, abundance and plenty do not translate into the wealth of a 
nation. Scarcity and high prices, of course, are misery. It is abundance and 
high prices that produces opulence. 
 
This shift would radically transform the meaning, the connotation, 
and the role of policing—and it would do so first in the writings of the 
earliest économistes. From François Quesnay’s first published contribution 
to the field of political economy, his encyclopedia entry on Fermiers 
(Farmers) in Tome VI of the Encyclopédie in 1756, to his final 
contributions to economics collected and published in Du Pont de 
Nemours’ Physiocratie in 1768, Quesnay would fundamentally reorient the 
relationship between public economy and “police”: governmental 
intervention in the markets would become oppressive and interfere with the 
autonomous functioning of an economic system governed by natural laws 
and natural order. By 1776, the year The Wealth of Nations was published, 
Adam Smith would no longer use the rubric “police” to discuss public 
economy. In fact, the word “police” appears rarely in the text of The 
Wealth of Nations.  
 
A new way of thinking had taken hold, one based on the idea of 
natural order. Natural order reigned in the economic domain—in 
agriculture and commerce—and thereby obviated the need for “police.” 
The sphere of public economy came to be viewed as an autonomous, self-
adjusting system regulated by natural laws that, if left alone, produced a net 
product. The only way for the state to participate in the wealth of the 
nation was not to administer and police, but instead to pull out of the 
sphere of agricultural production and stop intervening in commerce and 
trade. The police function was severed from the economic domain and 
relegated to the margin. 
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François Quesnay presented the idea of natural order to his 
contemporaries in his Tableau économique, first published in an 
augmented volume of the Marquis de Mirabeau’s L’Ami des hommes in 
1760. The Tableau was a graphic depiction of cash and commodity flows 
between the three principle classes of society—the cultivators, the property-
owners, and the manufacturers. By means of a simple graph and its zig-zag 
lines, Quesnay sought to visualize his main theses, namely that agricultural 
production is the sole source of all societal wealth, that wealth can only be 
produced by means of an autonomous system of exchange, and therefore 
that the state must cease intervening with tariffs, restrictions on the flow of 
trade, and other regulations. Quesnay’s Tableau économique received a lot 
of attention because it attempted to graphically and systematically represent 
an economic system—what Louis Dumont refers to as “an ordered 
whole.”
63
 This is precisely what Marx found so brilliant in Quesnay.
64
 But 
what was even more important and influential on future liberal thought was 
not simply the notion of an economic system, it was rather the idea of 
natural order. Systems can function well with external calibration and 
intervention: an engine may function as a perfect whole so long as one adds 
fuel. What was remarkable about Quesnay’s Tableau is that his system was 
governed by natural order and was entirely autonomous of external inputs. 
What Quesnay really contributed was not just the idea of a system, but that 
of natural orderliness—an idea that would eventually receive its most 
elaborate articulation in Le Mercier de la Rivière’s 1767 book, L’Ordre 
naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques.  
 
The birth or, perhaps to be fair, the emergence and maturation of 
the idea of natural order helped shape a vision of the economic sphere as an 
autonomous, self-adjusting, and self-regulated system that could achieve a 
natural equilibrium spontaneously and produce increased wealth. No 
doubt, material shifts in technology, in agricultural and industrial 
production, and larger changes in demographics and international relations, 
played important roles in the perceptual change. But what made the notion 
of a “free market” comprehensible, coherent, and convincing was precisely 
the idea of natural order. It is an idea that fundamentally altered the 
discourse and the dominant way of reasoning and rationalizing the world. It 
radically altered the way that contemporaries understood their social 
surroundings and the relationship between public economy and “police.”  
 
 The same notion resurfaces in the work of Adam Smith and Jeremy 
Bentham, and, today, in the work of contemporary neoliberal thinkers, 
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such as Richard Posner or Richard Epstein. The idea of natural order has 
metamorphosed today into the belief in the efficiency of the market. It is 
natural order that makes possible Richard Posner’s belief that “When 
transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by definition, the most 
efficient method of allocating resources.”
65
 In fact, natural efficiency is so 
central to Richard Posner’s thought that he defines criminal behavior in 
terms of efficiency: criminal behavior is human behavior that is inefficient. 
As Posner explains, “I argue that what is forbidden is a class of inefficient 
acts.”
66
 The very definition of crime turns on the notion of natural 
efficiency. In the very same way, the Physiocrats would define criminality as 
disorder and deviance from natural laws—as we will see shortly.  
 
Today’s neoliberal thought traces back to this severing of “police” 
and public economy. This discourse and way of reasoning has colonized our 
perception both of the Parisian markets of the eighteenth century and of 
our existing markets and exchanges. It is what allows many of us to believe, 
despite the mounting evidence to the contrary—despite the bailouts of Bear 
Stearns or Fannie Mae or A.I.G.—that our current market mechanisms are 
in fact self-adjusting and self-regulating, and achieve stability with little 
administration.  
 
VI. Distorting the Penal Sphere  
 
The next question is, then, at what price? At what price have so many of us 
come to believe that the economy is the realm of natural order and that the 
legitimate sphere of policing—of administration and government—lies 
elsewhere? At the price, first, of significantly distorting and expanding 
without limit the penal sphere, and, second, of naturalizing and hiding the 
regulatory mechanisms in our contemporary markets, and thereby masking 
the enormous wealth distributions that occur daily.  
 
First, the distortion of the penal sphere. The birth of natural order 
in the writings of the Physiocrats led seamlessly to the expansion of the 
penal sphere as the only legitimate space for governmental administration 
and intervention. The idea of orderliness matured into a political theory 
that combined laissez faire in commercial matters with centralized, 
authoritarian policing elsewhere—what the Physiocrats referred to as the 
doctrine of “legal despotism.” Under the rubric “legal despotism,” François 
Quesnay and Mercier de la Rivière formulated a political ideal of complete 
governmental inactivity in all but the penal sphere. Given the existence of 
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natural laws governing commerce, the économistes envisaged no role for the 
legislature except to criminalize and punish severely those who deviate from 
the natural order.  
 
 Natural order in the universe implied legal despotism in human 
affairs. The Physiocrats embraced this doctrine in 1767 with the 
publication that same year of both Quesnay’s essay, Despotisme de la 
Chine, and Le Mercier’s book, L’Ordre essentiel et naturel. Their economic 
writings led them, in a syllogistic manner, to the conclusion that natural 
order in an autonomous economic sphere demands both that there be no 
human intervention (in terms of positive law) in the economic realm and 
that positive law limit itself to punishing deviance from the natural order, in 
other words theft and violence. The logic proceeded as follows: 
 
1. The economic, agricultural, and commercial realm is governed 
by fundamental natural laws that best promote the interests of 
mankind. 
2. As a result, positive human-made laws could do no more than 
merely instantiate the fundamental natural laws. At best, 
positive law would simply mirror the natural order; any 
deviation would produce disorder rather than order. 
3. Therefore, positive law should not extend to the domain of 
natural laws, or, as Quesnay stated, “Positive legislation should 
therefore not reach the domain of physical laws.”
67
 
4. For this reason there is no need for a separate legislature. All 
law-making power should be centralized in a unified 
executive—a legal despot—who learns and implements the laws 
of nature. 
5. It is only those men whose passions are out-of-adjustment with 
natural order—those whose passions are “déréglées,”
68
 as 
Quesnay wrote—who fail to see and appreciate the fundamental 
laws of natural. 
6. The only object of positive man-made laws, then, should be to 
severely punish those whose passions are out-of-order, as a way 
to protect society from these thieves and derelicts—“des voleurs 
et des méchans,” as Quesnay would say.
69
  
 
The notion of natural order does all the work in this logical 
argument, and it leads inexorably to a penal sphere that is, on the one hand, 
marginalized, but on the other hand unleashed and allowed to expand 
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without any limitation. Since some men’s passions are out-of-order and 
these men cannot appreciate the natural order, the legal despot has full and 
unlimited discretion to repress and punish. Man-made, positive law serves 
only one legitimate function: to punish those who violate the natural order.  
 
Notice that the penal sphere, on this view, is portrayed as 
exceptional. It is the only domain where natural order does not 
autonomously produce the best result for mankind. It is the only place 
where order does not reign. It is entirely other, in this sense. It is the space 
outside the dominant realm of natural orderliness, the extremity where one 
finds, in Quesnay’s words, the passions déréglées and the hommes pervers.70 
The contrast with Beccaria and other cameralists could not be more 
pronounced: their seamless web of public economy and “police” gives way 
to a sharp distinction between a realm of economic order, where laissez faire 
must govern, and a realm for positive laws and penal sanctions, where the 
government must and may only legitimately intervene. The Physiocrats 
invent natural order in the economic domain but in the process, establish 
the penal sphere as the outer limit of the system, as the only legitimate 
realm for administration and repression, as the zone of policing. 
 
This new penal paradigm significantly influenced nineteenth 
century liberal and modern neoliberal thought. Although Adam Smith and 
Jeremy Bentham would reject Physiocratic thought—primarily because of 
Quesnay’s devotion to agriculture as the sole means of creating national 
wealth—both Smith and Bentham embraced and developed a notion of 
natural order in their economic writings and reproduced—by the odd 
conjunction of liberal economic theory and Beccarian punishment theory—
the same relationship between markets and punishment: natural order in 
the economic sphere but government intervention in the penal sphere.  
 
 This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction 
dominates the public imagination today. Many of us tend to view criminal 
law as the exception to an otherwise less regulated, more orderly market, 
where there—and there alone—the state must fully intervene to affect the 
decision making of wrongdoers. This is reflected in the pervasive idea that 
fraud and coercion are the major exception to mildly regulated markets. It 
is this precisely combination—order in the market and government at the 
border—that helped shape the modern neoliberal vision of penality.  
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This vision is reflected, in the most formal, technical, and pristine 
way in the writings of Richard Posner, eloquently formulated in the simple 
statement reproduced earlier, to the effect that “The major function of 
criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from bypassing the . . 
. “market,” explicit or implicit.”
71
 Here, the idea of market efficiency leads 
to a penal theory akin to legal despotism: the only legitimate space where 
government can intervene is in the penal sphere, in the space of market 
bypassing. Elsewhere, it must leave alone voluntary, compensated 
exchanges—as if the space of the market existed somehow independently of 
the policing, as if the two domains were distinct. Richard Posner’s further 
idea that crime can be defined in terms of actions that are not efficient 
rehearses the Physiocratic idea that the homme pervers—the perverted 
man—is the one who does not abide by the natural order of the universe. 
Posner’s vision of the criminal law is a modern reiteration—in a new 
vocabulary, to be sure, with more technical economic jargon—of the 
writings of the Physiocrats. Neoliberal penality traces back to the legal 
despotism of François Quesnay and Le Mercier de la Rivière.    
 
The modern discourse of natural order—the new version of market 
efficiency—facilitates the growth of the penal sphere by making it easier to 
resist government intervention in the marketplace but to embrace 
criminalizing any and all deviations from the market. It facilitates passing 
new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally—
because that is where administration is necessary; that is where the state can 
legitimately act; that is the proper sphere of policing. In other words, the 
neoliberal vision not only goes hand-in-hand with a certain way of 
perceiving markets and history—of believing, for instance, that the early 
markets of the eighteenth century were regulated excessively and that ours 
today are free—but it also eases the growth of the carceral sphere. By 
marginalizing and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, the 
neoliberal discourse fertilizes the penal domain.  
  
As a form of discourse, as a logic and rationality, neoliberal penality 
itself certainly does not cause more persons to be incarcerated. Naturally, 
there are more immediate factors that produce the increased prison rates, 
such as the War on Drugs, mandatory minimum sentencing, racial 
profiling, and political swings toward law-and-order politics, to name but a 
few. But as a form of discourse, neoliberal penality facilitates these more 
immediate and proximate factors. It makes them more easy by reducing the 
political resistance and friction. By making them seem more natural and 
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right. By intimating that government intervention in the penal sphere is 
proper and legitimate.  
 
Modern penal outcomes in the West are entirely consistent with 
this: The size and the cost of our neoliberal penal sphere in the West far 
exceeds those of earlier periods.
*
 In the United States, for instance, the 
twentieth century experienced very high rates and costs of 
institutionalization—in both prisons and asylums. Prison populations 
skyrocketed beginning in 1970, rising from under 200,000 persons to more 
than 1.3 million in 2002. That year, our prison rate surpassed for the first 
time the 600 mark—600 inmates per 100,000 adults. Including inmates in 
jail, the incarcerated population exceeded two million in 2001. In the 
1930s, 40s and 50s, the United States also institutionalized people at high 
rates, but in state and county mental hospitals, institutions for “mental 
defectives and epileptics” and “the mentally retarded,” psychiatric wards in 
VA hospitals, as well as “psychopathic,” city, and private mental hospitals. 
When the data on these mental institutions are combined with the data on 
prison rates for 1928 through 2000, the rates of overall institutionalization 
in this country are staggering: in the period between 1935 and 1963, the 
United States consistently institutionalized (in mental institutions and 
prisons) at rates above 700 per 100,000 adults—with highs of 778 in 1939 
and 786 in 1955.  
 
A study by the PEW Center on States published in March 2008 
reports that prison spending in the United States has outpaced all other 
comparable spending budgets except Medicaid. “Criminal correction 
spending is outpacing budget growth in education, transportation and 
public assistance, based on state and federal data. Only Medicaid spending 
grew faster than state corrections spending, which quadrupled in the past 
two decades.”
72
 According to the PEW report, corrections spending cost the 
states a staggering $47 billion in 2008, in large part because of the 
extraordinarily high rates of incarceration – the fact is, “One in every 31 
adults, or 7.3 million Americans, is in prison, on parole or probation, at a 
cost to the states of $47 billion in 2008.”
73
  
 
                                                 
*
 This project focuses on a shift over time from an earlier penal rationality to neoliberal 
penality. As a result, it is important to compare modern neoliberal penal practices to 
earlier periods in the same neoliberal countries, such as the United States, Britain, or 
France.  
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The last time these costs were studied, in 2001, the fifty states spent 
a combined $38 billion on corrections alone, excluding prison building.
74
 
California’s annual prison budget for 2007-08 was almost $10 billion 
dollars in 2007, nearly twice as large as it was in 2001.
75
 For many states, 
the annual budget allocates more funding for prisons than for four-year 
college education.
76
  
 
With about one percent of the adult population in the United 
States behind bars, the size and cost of our penal sphere is undoubtedly 
greater than it was in earlier periods. The costs and human capital 
associated with the criminal sanction are, today, exceedingly large. And this 
is consistent with the neoliberal penal vision: we are far more willing to 
spend dollars and allow the state to intervene in the penal sphere than we 
are in education or elsewhere, because that is where the government has a 
legitimate role. The federal bailouts of 2008 represent an exception to this 
logic; but they are exceptional and, in that sense, they prove the rule. Both 
sides of the political spectrum view the bailouts as “outrageous,” though 
necessary in a time of crisis to boost public confidence in the financial 
markets and ensure the continuing flow of credit to American homeowners. 
Most believe that the bailouts are temporary measures that will be followed 
by a return to normal. Even the New York Times editorial page assumes, 
for instance, that the nationalized Fannie and Freddie enterprises will 
eventually be privatized again. 
 
  
VII.  Masking Wealth Distributions 
 
Second. The rhetoric of neoliberalism naturalizes the market and thereby 
hides the massive distribution that takes place there. It masks the state’s 
role, the state’s ties to non-state associations—associations such as the 
Chicago Board of Trade—and the extensive legal and regulatory framework 
that encases those associations. But is also hides the freedom that existed 
before. In other words, it masks both the amount of freedom in the earlier 
eighteenth century and the amount of regulation today.  
 
 On the one hand, there was far more “freedom” in the Parisian 
markets of the eighteenth century than we tend to acknowledge today. The 
fact is, the police matters in eighteenth century Paris were trivial. Violations 
involved fines only, and mostly trifling fines at that. Accusations triggered 
minimal process. The punishments were minor. As Duchesne explained in 
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his discussion in Title I, § III, Des Sentences: “The intervention of 
prosecutors is not necessary in police matters, everything there should be 
treated summarily and judged immediately;” “fines and other punishments 
imposed in police matters are not accompanied by disgrace;” and “the 
punishments [meted out by the police] ordinarily should be moderate and 
serve only to prevent the repetition of the offense.”
77
 The police jurisdiction 
was essentially a civil, not a criminal, matter and for most of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was part of the civil chamber. At 
various times, such as during the reforms of the Bureau de Police of 1572, 
the police was simply reduced to street cleaning.
78
  
 
The history of the founding of the police chamber reflects its 
secondary status. Louis XIV, after taking power in his own hands, turned 
first to finances, but then to justice and police matters. He created two 
special sessions of his council, one for matters of justice and one for matters 
of police. The first, the council on justice, he presided over himself on 
numerous occasions. It produced in 1667 the codification of rules of civil 
procedure, what was referred to as “ordonnance civile”, as well as, in 1670, 
the codification of criminal procedure—“l’ordonnance criminelle.” The 
second council on police, we know far less about, because it received so 
much less attention and Louis XIV never presided over the sessions. It was 
simply far less important. Louis XIV ultimately carved out the police 
chamber from within the civil lieutenant’s job description and second-
seated the lieutenant de police. “The lieutenant de police will seat ordinarily 
at the Châtelet in the chamber dite Chambre civile, and will dispose of a 
small office adjacent.”
79
 The police of the Châtelet was by no means a 
criminal jurisdiction—there was a separate chamber for those more 
important matters—levied only minor fines, if that, and took a second seat 
to both the criminal chamber and the civil chamber.  
 
A close examination of the archives from the police of the Châtelet 
of Paris maintained at the National Archives of France, the famous Série Y, 
reveals the trivial and sporadic nature of the policing. The leading recurring 
violation that the police commissioners noted on their rounds was the 
failure to sweep one’s storefront—the entry read “non balayé,” in other 
words “not swept.” The papers, reports, and records of the police chamber 
read like those of a small claims court and presented predominantly trivial 
matters. For instance, the carton of papers for the first six months of 1758 
contains month-by-month reports of the daily activity of the police 
commissioners and lists all the violations — the contraventions — that the 
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commissioners observed. Most of the contraventions are for failure to sweep 
the side-walk. They read as follows: “Police des 8 et 9 février 1758: Le 
devant de la porte du cabaret au merle blanc non balayé. Rue des francs 
Bourgeois: Le devant du cabaret de tardif aux fontaines de bourgogne non 
balayé.” And the list of “non balayé” goes on and on, interspersed with 
violations for individuals found gaming or drinking in taverns past the 
closing hour. Here is the report of Commissioner Dubuisson, returned at 
the audience of the police chamber on July 21, 1758, archived in carton 
Y9459/B which covered the last six months of 1758—a relatively typical 
entry: 
 
8 July 1758 – no violations 
10 said month – no violations 
11 said month – no violations 
12 s.m. – 3 cases of failure to sweep the street 
13 – nothing 
14 – nothing 
15 – nothing 
17 – nothing 
18 said month of July – 4 cases of failure to sweep 
19 s.m. – 8 cases of failure to sweep 
20 s.m. – nothing 
 
Here is the report of the same commissioner, Dubuisson, submitted to the 
police chamber the following week, July 28, 1758: 
 
21 July – no violations 
22 same month – vehicle without plates or a number blocking public 
access; stones left in disarray by a master mason blocking the streams; 
neglected mound of gravel; 2 cases of failure to sweep 
24 – nothing 
25 – nothing  
26 – wood and stones blocking the public way; 4 cases of failure to sweep;  
28 s.m. – 3 cases of neglected gravel; manure causing bad odors; garbage 
thrown in our presence from the window of the second floor of the house 
occupied by the baker near the rue de la tinerandrie; failure to sweep. 
 
No need to belabor the point: the records reflect predominantly 
trivial violations when they reflect any at all. The contrast with the records 
of the criminal jurisdiction of the Châtelet of Paris is striking. A review of 
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the carton for January and February 1760 discloses serious cases, with 
lengthy informations, interrogatories, and long indictments with numerous 
witnesses. The process and types of cases in the criminal files make the 
police chamber look like child’s play.  
 
The trivial nature of the commissioners’ beat reports reflects, in 
part, the fact that these commissioners had a large number of other 
functions, both civil and criminal, beyond merely enforcing these petty 
violations of police ordinances. The commissioners—recall their full title, 
“commissaires enquêteurs examinateurs”—functioned as notary publics and 
registrars of police complaints (in cases ranging from rape and theft to 
traffic accidents), they made inventories, sealed property, and took 
testimony, they were responsible for maintaining the peace and 
investigating serious crimes, including capital cases—and were available 
twenty-four hours a day. The commissioners purchased their office from 
the King at a hefty price (as much as 100,000 livres by the late eighteenth 
century) and several of their other functions (in contrast to their duties 
owed the lieutenant général) were remunerated on a commission basis—
and as a result happened to take a lot of their time. In 1759, for instance, a 
commissioner was allowed to ask for three livres per hour, with a minimum 
fee of nine livres, for taking down complaints and declarations; for eight 
livres per one hundred lines (each thirteen syllables long) of an inventory; 
and half a livre per page (each page twenty-two lines of twelve syllables) for 
copying any and all documents. In other words, the commissioners were 
busy with other tasks. 
 
And they too, like many of us, were more drawn to high-profile 
cases than to the more pedestrian tasks of policing fine-only ordinances. So 
when one examines their papers at the Archives Nationales, it becomes clear 
that they were far more interested in the procès-verbaux—the verbal 
testimonials of witnesses—in capital cases and the more intriguing and 
entertaining cases of pederasts (homosexuals) and femmes du monde 
(prostitutes). When cases involving grain did come to their attention and 
occupy their time, it generally involved significant cases of alleged theft, and 
not simply trivial deviations from market regulations. 
 
More to the point, a careful review of the sentences meted out by 
the police chamber of the Châtelet reveals that the police des grains 
constituted a minor function of the chamber’s jurisdiction. This is evident 
from a quantitative study of a collection of 932 sentences and ordinances 
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from the police chamber meted out over the period 1668 to 1787, 
contained in two cartons at the National Archives. Of the 932 records, 580 
are police sentences, and of those, only seventy-seven or 8.40 percent are 
related in some way to the cultivation and commerce of grain, to the market 
in grains, to bakers, millers, or other activities that have a bearing on bread, 
flour, or grain; with another twenty-seven or 2.94 percent very tangentially 
related or touching in any way whatsoever on grain or bread. Of the 
seventy-seven relevant sentences, only sixty resulted in fines. Within the 
category of the highest fines meted out—3,000 livres or more—grain-
related offenses represented a small fraction of the whole, only two (or 5.4 
percent) of thirty-seven such fines. There was only one sentence of 
imprisonment meted out in the entire period, and it was for a servant who 
did not deliver goods—unrelated to the grain trade. It turns out, the police 
des grains represented a small fraction of the business of the lieutenant de 
police, all of which was essentially trivial. The archival records reveal a 
disproportionate number of terribly minor infractions and a relatively small 
place for the police des grains. The historians of the Parisian grain and 
bread markets—predominantly liberal opponents of the regulations such as 
Freminville and Afanassiev—did a skilled job of picking out the sentences 
related to the police des grains from the haystack of police records. But we 
should be weary that so much of our understanding of the police des grains 
is filtered through the lens of these opponents who had a morbid 
fascination with regimentation.  
  
 On the other hand, there is also far more “constraint” in our 
contemporary markets than we typically tend to acknowledge today. The 
truth is, every action of the broker, buyer, seller, investment bank, 
brokerage firm, exchange member—even non-member—is scrutinized and 
regulated. The rules, oversight committees, advisory letters, investigations, 
as well as the legal actions, abound. The list of do’s and don’ts is extensive. 
Brokerage firms may combine and use black-lists to restrict retail buyers 
from reselling their public offering stock during a “retail restricted period” 
of between 30 and 90 days following their purchase of newly offered stock, 
but the same brokerage firms may allow large institutions to dump their 
stock in the aftermarket at any time. Exchange members on the New York 
Stock Exchange may get together and fix the commission rate on stock 
transactions of less than $500,000—i.e. set the price of buying and selling 
stock—but freely negotiate commissions in larger stock transactions. The 
National Association of Securities Dealers may combine and agree to 
restrict the sale and fix the resale price of securities of open-end 
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management companies—“mutual funds”—in the secondary market 
between dealers, between dealers and investors, and between investors, 
thereby eliminating the secondary market in mutual funds—a market 
which was significant prior to 1940; and competing corporate take-over 
bidders may join together and make joint take-over offers to stockholders, 
even if it means that together they reduce the offering price for the stock 
purchase. The rules and regulations surrounding our modern markets are 
intricate and often arcane, and they belie the simplistic idea that our 
markets are “free.” The reality is far more complex.  
 
Today, we want to see freedom even when there is nothing but 
constraint in front of us. That desire, that urge to believe is precisely what 
masks the distribution that accompanies the actual administration of 
contemporary markets. Because we want to believe that the markets are 
operating on their own, we let slide the actual cash flows and fail to 
properly scrutinize how the administration of the markets actually 
distributes wealth. Because we want to believe in self-adjusting markets, we 
do not adequately investigate the consequences of our choices. There is a 
paragraph in the standard commodities futures contract on the Chicago 
Board of Trade that provides that all grain shall be delivered in the City of 
Chicago. The City of Chicago has a finite capacity for warehousing grain, 
and is at a good distance from the corn, wheat, and soybean fields of 
Nebraska. That may increase the relative costs for the Nebraska farmer. The 
mere existence of standardized commodities futures contracts—which were 
first permitted in the twentieth century—tends to slightly reduce the mean 
price of commodities. This too may work to the detriment of the producer. 
These are some of the distributional consequences that go unexamined, 
precisely because we do not want to see all the choices that organize the 
market—because the market has been naturalized. The idea of natural order 
and, today, of market efficiency obfuscates these distributions of wealth and 
resources.  
 
 
VIII. Method 
 
A word on method. I am by no means the first to toil in these fields and 
this project owes much to the ground-breaking work of Joseph Schumpeter, 
Robert Hale, Louis Dumont, Michel Foucault, and many others, who have 
all contributed in important ways to our understanding of late modern 
capitalism. The objective of this particular project may be different, but 
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naturally builds on their insights. This study seeks to explore the mode of 
rationality that made neoliberalism “natural” today—that naturalized our 
conception of the penal sphere as the outer limit of the free market, as the 
unique location where government intervention is automatically legitimate. 
The goal is not to offer a historical explanation why this mode of rationality 
developed, nor to propose a material explanation—whether economic or 
political—as to how the idea of natural order emerged. It is instead to trace 
how certain beliefs—for instance, the idea that the Parisian markets were 
overregulated and that our modern exchanges are free—became believable. 
How they became so obvious. And at what price.  
 
 In this sense, this project continues in the furrow of a lengthy 
nominalist tradition—a strain of thought that runs through the work of 
thinkers as far back as the Medieval Franciscan friar William of Occam, to 
the sixteenth century Renaissance essays of Michel de Montaigne, to the 
nineteenth century polemics of Friedrich Nietzsche. It starts by 
conceptualizing “natural order” and “market efficiency” as what William of 
Occam would have called “universals,” and then explores what work those 
universals are accomplishing. It challenges the very existence of those 
universal categories in order to discover, first, what the designation serves, 
but second, what it hides regarding the unique aspects of individual entities 
– in this case, individual forms of social and economic organization.  
 
The answer that I develop in these pages reflects this nominalist 
influence: we have developed and deployed these universals to make sense 
of what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena, to place discreet and 
divergent practices into a coherent framework, to deploy simple heuristic 
devices or stereotypes to expedite our evaluation and judgment. In so doing 
so, we have created structures of meaning that do work for us—at a steep 
price.  
 
The historian, Paul Veyne, in his recent book Foucault: Sa pensée, 
sa personne (2008), excavates a similar nominalist influence in the work of 
Foucault, drawing particular attention to the opening passage of Foucault’s 
1979 lectures, Naissance de la biopolitique.80 In that opening lecture, 
Foucault steps back to explain and reframe his larger intellectual project and 
to place his writings within a methodological framework. The method in all 
his work, Foucault explains, had always been to start by doing away with 
the central explanatory concept, as a way to reexamine the work that the 
concept accomplished. Foucault lectured: 
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I start from the decision, both theoretical and methodological, 
which consists in saying: suppose that the universals do not exist, 
and then I ask the question to history and historians: how can you 
write the history if you do not admit  a priori that something like 
the state, society, the sovereign, subjects exist? It is the same 
question that I posed  when I asked: … suppose that madness does 
not exist.
81
    
 
The use of the term “universals” is revealing and, as Paul Veyne 
suggests, the passage links Foucault back to the tradition of nominalism.
82
 
Foucault’s method was to critically examine the very conceptions that we 
construct in order to learn something about ourselves.
83
 Foucault’s 
nominalism was fed, in part, by a large dose of skepticism—especially, of 
skepticism of the constructs of others, of those many universals. It is in this 
sense that Veyne correctly characterizes Foucault as a skeptic—although it is 
important to keep nominalism and skepticism distinct and separate. In a 
similar vein, this project asks: suppose that “natural order” or “market 
efficiency” does not exist. What does that tell us about the way that we now 
understand the world? What work do those concepts perform? These 
questions too are nominalist and build on a centuries-old tradition of 
thought.  
 
Although this project shares a methodological sensibility with 
Foucault, this project breaks in part from his analysis. The fact is, Foucault 
reified the idea that the police des grains under the ancien régime was 
regulated excessively and he also strongly intimated that the modern 
economic sphere has been liberalized. Even though Foucault’s overarching 
project was to show that both were forms of governance, Foucault 
nevertheless created and deployed categories in a manner that is somewhat 
antithetical to this project. In his 1978 lectures, Michel Foucault specifically 
deployed the category of discipline in its purest, most pristine form, to 
describe the grain trade. It served as the central illustration to demarcate the 
three key elements of discipline: la police des grains were centripetal; it 
focused on the smallest of minor details and sought to eradicate all disorder; 
and it categorized into the permissible and the impermissible, prohibiting 
the latter. Foucault reified the idea that the Parisian markets were 
excessively regulated with his use of the expression, “la police disciplinaire 
des grains”: “if we take again the example of the disciplinary police of grain 
as it existed until the middle of the eighteenth century, as set out in 
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hundreds of pages in Delamare’s Traité de la police, we see that the 
disciplinary police of grain is in fact centripetal.”84  
 
This project seeks precisely to demystify that claim. Similarly, with 
regard to modern markets, Foucault also reified the difference with the 
ancien régime. To describe modern market practices, Foucault abandoned 
the paradigm of discipline and fashioned a new category: sécurité. My 
project is different. The point is not to show that both the police des grains 
and neoliberalism are both forms of governmentality – which is certainly 
true – but rather that neither can be categorized in the ways they tend to be 
perceived and that the categories themselves of overly-disciplined – of the 
disciplinary police of grains – and of liberalized, that those categories 
themselves are meaningless and obfuscate the real work that needs to be 
done. This project is premised on the belief that we have no way of 
knowing whether our contemporary practices are more or less liberal, more 
or less freedom enhancing, more or less regulated. We have far more 
administration today than meets the eye or that we tend to recognize. 
Whether it amounts to more or less is impossible to quantify. But the fact 
is, we characterize these contemporary practices as more liberal—which is 
precisely the problem.  
 
 
IX. A Prolegomenon 
 
Under the entry “Grains” of the Encyclopédie volume published in 1757, 
François Quesnay proposed that “It is quite sufficient that the government 
simply not interfere with industry,” “suppress the prohibitions and 
prejudicial constraints on internal commerce and reciprocal external trade,” 
“abolish or diminish tolls and transport charges,” and “extinguish the 
privileges levied on commerce by the provinces.”
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 François Quesnay’s 
vision of an economic system governed by an ordre naturel led to a political 
theory of legal despotism that would radically unbundle the earlier 
understanding of a overlapping relationship between public economy and 
the penal sphere. By relegating the state to the margins of the market and 
giving it free rein there and there alone, the idea of natural order facilitated 
the unrestrained expansion of the penal sphere. It gave birth to neoliberal 
penality. 
 
 The hitch is that the foundational categories of, on the one hand, 
“natural order,” “market efficiency,” or “the free market,” and, on the other 
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hand, “excessive regulation,” “governmental inefficiency,” or “discipline,” 
are illusory and misleading categories that fail to capture the irreducibly 
individual phenomena of different forms of market organization. In all 
markets, the state is present. Naturally, it is present when it fixes the price 
of a commodity such as wheat or bread. But it is also present when it 
subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, when it grants a charter 
to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits trading of an instrument 
like a futures contract, when it protects the property interests of wheat 
wholesalers, when it facilitates the river transport of wheat, when it 
criminalizes the coordination of prices, when it allows the merger of grain 
companies, when it polices the timing of trades, etc. In addition, whenever 
the government is not itself regulating a market, it implicitly or explicitly 
delegates that authority to another entity. All markets are highly regulated. 
At the same time, in all markets, there is freedom. Even in a controlled 
economy where the price is fixed, there are variations in the quality of the 
goods sold and along other dimensions that create product differentiation. 
These produce cues at certain stores and not at others. Even in a highly 
criminalized economy where certain goods are outlawed, there are black 
markets that emerge and develop into robust trading markets where those 
illegal goods can be purchased and sold.  
 
 In the economic sphere, there is freedom and there is constraint. 
What we see is a reflection on us, not of the market. It makes little sense to 
describe one regime as free and another as regulated. All systems have 
complicated regulatory mechanisms that make the market function and 
dysfunction. What is most important is to remember that the categories we 
use to organize, understand, discuss, categorize, and compare the different 
organizing principles are just that—labels. They do not capture the true 
individuality of the objects described. And they have the unfortunate effect 
of obscuring rather than enlightening. They obscure by making one set of 
objects seem natural and necessary, and the other naturally unnecessary.  
 
 The central problem is that we use these categories for purposes of 
evaluation. We classify forms of market organization into free and regulated 
in order to embrace or reject those forms of economic organization. Even 
today, after the financial crisis of 2008, politicians continue to argue for 
more “regulation” as if “regulation” was a solution. Those categories, 
however, are simply not useful when evaluating different forms of economic 
organization. They are not useful when we are trying to evaluate 
distributional consequences. The idea that “government tends to be 
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inefficient” is not helpful—no more so than the idea that “markets are 
naturally efficient.” There are locations of remarkable government 
efficiencies (high-speed rail in France; mass transport in Paris), just as there 
are locations of remarkable waste in private enterprises (million dollar 
bathrooms for Merrill Lynch; million dollar throw-aways in Halliburton 
projects). Naturally, these are all debatable and there are arguments that 
these are not efficient or inefficient.     
 
But when it comes to evaluating how resources are distributed, these 
categories do not help. And that is what we are trying to determine – how 
resources are allocated and distributed and whether those distributions 
correspond to our political values.  
 
 This article is a prolegomenon, a necessary first step in the direction 
of properly assessing modern forms of social and economic organization. 
Necessary, because of the deafening and dominant discourse of natural 
order and market efficiency. The very idea that we would use the term 
“free” to describe our current market system—a system which is regulated 
through and through—is a testament to the work that needs to be done. It 
may be fair to say that the idea of natural order has so deeply and 
fundamentally warped our understanding of economic systems that it will 
take a lot of work to reach the point where we can properly assess different 
alternatives for the administration of markets and punishment, and 
dismantle our neoliberal penality. 
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